The Dieppe Raid of 19 August left an indelible mark on Canada. As the first major offensive against Hitler’s Festung Europa, Operation Jubilee was a severe military setback. Within a few hours, five thousand Canadians (over 80 percent of the attacking force) suffered losses of almost 70 percent. Since that fateful day historians have offered various explanations of the causes and consequences of the disaster. For some, the lessons learned contributed to the success of the Normandy landings in 1944. Others have argued Dieppe was nothing more than a useless sacrifice. Rarely has a military operation so polarized opinions and intrigued researchers. That said, virtually every study on Dieppe focuses on the tactical and operational level of the raid. Indeed, with the exception of the works by Brian L. Villa and Peter Henshaw that cover the decision-making process, most historians have attempted to analyze the operation’s weaknesses rather than debate its relevance. The way the planners of Jubilee publicized the event, even though the episode is etched into our memories, has interested historians even less. It took Timothy J. Balzer’s close look at the communication strategy of Combined Operations Headquarters to conclude that, overall, the story fed to the newspapers had been written in advance, regardless of the raid’s outcome. Just as historian Paul Veyne reflected on whether the ancient Greeks believed in their myth, it is worth asking to what extent Canadians were duped by the subterfuge. Polling methods during the war were largely experimental and therefore unreliable which makes examining a source as volatile as public opinion a challenge. Nevertheless, it is possible to get an idea of the popular mood by examining indirect sources such as newspapers. If we agree that, in a democratic society, the press is the mirror of tensions and power struggles, an analysis of this complex medium should help us better understand the story that was “sold” to the public and how it was received. This article will test this hypothesis on a sample of Quebec francophone newspapers, which is where the manipulation of information reached new heights, with sometimes astonishing results.

To Manipulate: a Double-Edged Sword

In the summer of 1942, the Canadian press focused on the battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein. Except for the attacks by German submarines in the St. Lawrence River, the war remained a vague concept in Canada, almost surreal, lived by proxy essentially through the media, newspapers and radio, or the letters sent home by those fighting the great crusade. It is in that context that Canadians received news of the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942. This article attempts to clarify the issue by analyzing the way French-Canadian newspapers “sold” the news and how this communications strategy lead to the opposite result to that intended. Ironically, by focusing on the heroic struggle of the only French-Canadian regiment involved in the operation – les Fusiliers Mont-Royal – and on its casualties, the francophone press in Quebec helped shaped the myth that French-Canadian troops were the principal victims of the disaster.
the Dieppe raid. The first press releases confirmed the involvement of Canadians. On the home front, the war finally became a tangible reality, involving soldiers with which the population could identify. The public relations service of Combined Operations Headquarters attempted to transform a military fiasco into a victory with releases insisting that several objectives had been achieved. For over two months, it would present the Canadian military debut as a turning point in the war, a necessary sacrifice that would pave the way to the great invasion of Europe. From these military releases the press constructed a narrative that various newspapers adapted according to their particular perspectives.

Newspaper accounts evolved in three phases: “strategic” (19-20 August) during which a justification of the operation was attempted; “heroic” (21 August – 14 September), without doubt the most paradoxical since the casualty lists were printed alongside articles celebrating the “exploits” of the soldiers; finally, “revelatory” (from 15 September) that provided the official account of losses and three days later the release of an official report on the operation. Was this sequence of coverage the result of a specific information strategy? Following a thorough look of the military archives in Ottawa and London, historian Timothy J. Balzer answered yes to that question. His account reveals that, even before the raid started, Combined Operations Headquarters had decided that the operation would be presented as a success, no matter its outcome.

Because media organizations tend to draw from similar sources, the three-phase sequence of coverage can be found in most Canadian publications, and it ended with the same level of bitterness from coast to coast. Through the media, the brutal test of Dieppe tended to unify Canadians who, at least in the course of a few weeks, came to share a common understanding of the raid. The bubble burst at the end of summer, once the extent of the disaster was revealed.

Surprisingly, the most virulent criticisms did not come from French
Canada, even though, as its rejection of conscription in the plebiscite of 1942 demonstrated, it remained hostile to any unlimited military commitment to the war. Instead, the most damning critiques first appeared in the Conservative Anglo-Canadian press. Operation Jubilee was used to further pressure the government on the question of overseas conscription and attack the Liberals’ management of the war, in particular their determination not to antagonize the French Canadian electorate. In this regard, the government’s communication strategy, which consisted of providing information tailored to French Canadians, heightened tensions. For example, the coverage of the raid led to a skirmish between the Toronto Star (Liberal), which spoke glowingly of the French Canadians’ participation, and the Globe and Mail (Conservative) which took offence that French Canadians received so much attention. The Star subsequently misunderstood the Globe and Mail’s criticism, which was explained by Le Devoir: “the Star forgot that the Globe and Mail believes it can tarnish M. King’s record by targeting the Star.”

Unfortunately for the Liberal government, the Combined Operations Headquarters’ information strategy missed its target. The gap between the triumphant rhetoric and the failure of the operation was too wide. The Canadian high command would later plead for the release of a more realistic version, however Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief of Combined Operations, vigorously objected, with his communication services reasserting control over the information released by British newspapers. The British pressures were all the more obvious when the Canadian Army’s official historian, C.P. Stacey, planned, in mid-September, on publishing the army’s first official report on the raid. Mountbatten personally intervened to water down an honest document. This deception discredited the Canadian government. Even the most moderate critics accused the government of concealing its responsibility for the fiasco.

The francophone press drew from the same sources as its Anglophone counterparts, making use of reports from war correspondents and official releases, while following the directives from the censorship authorities. As a result, dissenting points of view were expressed in editorials and in the treatment of the news. Nevertheless this criticism steadily diminished. From May 1942, censorship was reorganized and the Department of National Defence used the opportunity to control more closely the dissemination of military information in the written press and on radio. Moreover, in July the government information service decided to primarily use newspapers to transmit their message. Indeed, its new director, Charles Vinning, felt that newspapers were more efficient than the propaganda posters and pamphlets already in wide circulation. This led to the idea to release in the press portraits of French Canadian soldiers with whom it was assumed the francophone public were more likely to identify. The Dieppe operation was a golden opportunity to promote their valour in combat, however, because of the outcome of the raid, the result proved disappointing. Ironically the communication strategy backfired and persuaded many French Canadians that they had largely been sacrificed in this fatal foray. Three examples illustrate what became a deep-rooted myth in the collective memory of French Canada.

In the history of the Stanislas College, the two founders of the institution, Jeannette and Guy Boulizon, write that “the ill-fated raid on Dieppe [was to] result in over 2000 victims in several hours, essentially French Canadians.” During an interview, Jeannette Boulizon explained that “the French were absolutely shocked [to see] that Quebecers were sent to the beaches of Dieppe to get killed, while the English [Canadians] were taking it easy...Senior officers remained in England...all the young French Canadians, all of them, went to their deaths!” Also during an interview, François-Albert Angers, an eminent economist offered a similar interpretation: “My reaction was that, overall, French Canadians had been sacrificed; experiments had been conducted with our soldiers, by sending them on an impossible mission.” A Quebec history textbook from the 1980s stated the same thing: “French Canadian troops suffered a resounding defeat. They lost 2753 men, killed, wounded or taken prisoner.” How is it possible that educated and well-informed people could believe such falsehood? Could part of the answer be found in the media hype surrounding Jubilee? This article seeks to test this hypothesis by analyzing a sample of four significant francophone
To justify the operation: the strategic phase

From the four newspapers emerges a common narrative, almost mythical, featuring the only francophone unit involved, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR). The stories focused on figures like their chaplain, Major Armand Sabourin, and their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, as the “heroes of Dieppe.” Their advocates, the war correspondents and in particular Ross Munro, who gave a well-publicized presentation in Quebec, were added to this group. Despite the FMR’s secondary role in the Dieppe Raid, the unit soon became the focus of the tragedy in Quebec.

On 19 August 1942, the raid on Dieppe made the headlines everywhere. The newspapers unanimously hailed a costly, yet necessary victory. The official story was a virtual reproduction of the reports released by Combined Operations Headquarters. Within a few days, the story of Dieppe appeared set in stone. With the tragedy barely over, all the key elements, as well as the justifications—still emphasized by many today—grabbed the headlines. Like the other dailies, Le Devoir included Canadian Press releases announcing that Canadian troops had managed to land “on all the selected spots” and “took the beach by storm” after sustaining “a particularly violent resistance on their left flank while they landed tanks at the centre and the right flank quickly reached its objective.”

In an editorial, Georges Pelletier moderated such enthusiasm by pointing out that the raid was nothing more than “test” like so many operations before. As for La Presse, it concluded that Dieppe was a complete success, comparing the landing to the raid against St. Nazaire when the Germans had been caught by surprise and sustained “very heavy casualties.” Turcotte, Le Canada’s editorialist, insisted the raid was a precursor to a greater invasion of continental Europe: “a dress rehearsal for the day when British forces throw aside Nazi fortifications.”

Apart from the exact toll in human life, the sequence of events was made public less than 24 hours after the end of the operation. The main justification for the raid was strategic: Dieppe was a “dress rehearsal for the launch of a Second Front in Europe.” The operation also resulted from operational imperatives: Canadian Military Headquarters in London insisted on the raid’s “experimental” nature, congratulating itself for
having acquired “vital experience in the employment of troops in large numbers in an attack as well as an experience in the transport of their heavy equipment during combined operations.” Finally, the operation was part of a comprehensive effort to test German defences in raids on places such as St. Nazaire, Spitzberg and Iceland.26 According to the Allies the objectives were partially achieved through the destruction of a battery of six guns and its ammunition magazine, a radio station and an anti-aircraft battery. Combined Operations used these small successes to justify the usage of their communications plan written before the raid took place. Ironically, the same newspapers published German communiqués that described the operation as a “crushing defeat,” an “enterprise planned by amateurs” for political rather than military gains.27 Contradictions between Allied and enemy information added to the confusion and helped plant the seeds of unease—some Allied sources claimed 15,000 troops participated in the raid.

In the immediate aftermath of the raid only Gérard Pelletier of Le Devoir guessed the participation of the FMR and openly questioned the fate of French Canadian soldiers: “it is believed that among those who participated in the raid at Dieppe were troops belonging to the francophone Montreal regiment known as the “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” as well as other French Canadian units. We must wait for details and the lists of wounded and missing will allow us to better assess the part played by our soldiers in the raid on Dieppe.”28 It was not until the second phase of coverage, on 21 August, that the Fusiliers Mont-Royal became a part of the story. Of all the newspapers, Le Devoir was the most alarmed about this news. “There is concern that Canadian losses were heavy at Dieppe. Here, we wait for the lists, especially as they relate to the Fusiliers Mont-Royal,” read the headline. Such wording suggests that the myth of Dieppe, the idea that French Canadians had been primarily sacrificed during the fighting, began to take shape as soon as the raid was announced, at least among nationalists. Alerted by the reports from the war correspondents, Gérard Pelletier feared the worst:

The news already available on Dieppe make us anticipate long lists of dead and wounded, as well as missing. All the correspondents who give an account of what happened at Dieppe and in the vicinity point out that the fighting was intense, the losses considerable and, if the victorious soldiers returned to England, many remained in France or will be sent to German prison camps. We should have expected that.29

Other newspapers, albeit more enthusiastically, also implied that the FMR did all the work, thus helping forge the myth of the French Canadian sacrifice at Dieppe. In this regard, Le Canada’s headline captures the sentiment:

The “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” did us proud in Dieppe / French Canadians carried propaganda pamphlets and posters asking the French to remain neutral so as not to attract retaliation / Heroism of a chaplain / Nazis murder their French Canadian prisoners and had others stripped naked, but could not prevent their return with their wounded.30

La Presse saluted on its cover page “the excellent conduct of our Fusiliers at Dieppe…under intense enemy fire.”31 Echoing La Presse, La Patrie stressed the “heroism of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and their chaplains at Dieppe.”32

Over the next two days, the dispatches almost always presented the Canadian soldiers as “commandos,” with the effect of magnifying their exploits. Newspapers, including Le Devoir, did not question this metamorphosis from simple soldiers into super heroes. The first headlines distinguished clearly the “English commandos” from the “Canadian infantry.” Such distinctions soon disappeared from the accounts. Instead, the editors stopped differentiating infantry and commandos by emphasizing that the

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Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, the commander of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal at Dieppe, was hailed in the press as one of the heroes of the failed operation.
The most striking headline belonged to La Patrie: “The commandos left Dieppe in ruins.” The Fusiliers Mont-Royal soon shared in this glory; they were characterized as “commandos” as soon as their participation in the raid was announced. Canadian Press correspondent William Stewart maintained that they had been “trained” as such and he also claimed that he had accompanied them in their training. A similar claim can be traced to Le Canada: “the Fusiliers had long been trained in the tactics used by commandos” - and in Le Devoir which depicted the Fusiliers “as commandos from Quebec specially trained...for the historic raid on Dieppe.” The term “commando” disappeared from official accounts as early as 22 August, yet it continued to be used by newspapers. Editors continued to use “commando” in the captions accompanying pictures of soldiers at Dieppe, a sign that the term was firmly entrenched in the vocabulary of the raid.

To “embellish” the carnage: the Heroic Phase

During the “heroic phase,” the gap between a triumphant narrative and the lists of victims published daily by newspapers became more apparent. It explains the “uneasiness” J.L. Ralston, the minister of National Defence, attempted to dissipate with the release of a first official account of Jubilee. Meanwhile, the Army’s public relations unit continued to feed the press with stories from war correspondents and testimonies celebrating FMR soldiers. Both were heavily exploited by Quebec newspapers, no matter their political leaning. For example, Le Devoir printed a Canadian Press cable which gave the prominent role in the raid to the French Canadian unit: “The Fusiliers Mont-Royal and their comrades valiantly received their baptism of fire in combat. The level of violence was comparable to what their fathers had experimented during the Great War. They saw a number of their comrades fall under enemy fire, others collapse covered with wounds, and others captured by the Germans.”

The FMR were again portrayed as elite soldiers: “Because of their energy, combat skill and composure while going through preliminary exercises in England, those French Canadians were chosen for the operation against Dieppe, the first of a series of great operations aimed at preparing the invasion of the European continent.” A similar point of view, written by William Stewart, was published in La Presse. He stressed “the excellent conduct of our Fusiliers” in “the hell of Dieppe.” Le Canada was equally hagiographical in emphasizing the central role played by the FMR as well as their enthusiasm for battle: “From the
start, they were assigned to a most difficult sector, one that required all their courage: German weapons fired on the landing beach, in front of the city; the Montrealers fought like all the others, with heroism, and returned to their base with many missing.  

However, the attempts to idealize the heroism ran headlong into the stark reality of the casualty figures. The constant reminders of the Canadians’ bravery in combat paralleled the various homages to the fallen – burials in England, and a religious service in Montreal. During that period, two events, the release of a preliminary report on the raid and the conference held by Ross Munro, offered the opportunity to recapitulate and justify the raid, ten days before the official tally of total losses was released, on 15 September. From 21 August to 4 September, official lists naming those killed were published almost daily by newspapers, sometimes several in one day, in the midst of enthusiastic articles hailing the performance of the Canadians at Dieppe.

This almost schizophrenic representation of the raid was far less favourably received in the Anglophone press than by French Canadian newspapers. The Ottawa Journal lost patience: “Can we be expected to know the truth and act upon it if those who are leaders keep the facts from us and try to feed us on sugar-coated stories.” Two days later, the Globe and Mail was even more to the point: “Despite official protestations that the raid on Dieppe was a startling success, there is little evidence to justify that conclusion.”

No such criticisms can be found in the francophone press, proud as it was of “its” Fusiliers’ sacrifice. Could it be because the exploits of the famous regiment, no matter the cost paid, offset the insults against French Canadians for rejecting conscription? In the aftermath of the plebiscite, Quebec Premier Adélaïd Godbout had felt it necessary to explain in the legislature: “yesterday’s vote on the plebiscite, in the province of Quebec is not the refusal to make sacrifices for the defence of our country. We, French Canadians, are no less loyal than the others.”

Hailed as icons, the Fusiliers were thus used to justify a controversial position and promote the advantages of voluntary service. In this context, the lists of fallen soldiers sanctified the francophone regiment and discouraged open criticism, even from Quebec nationalists. Le Canada avoided altogether the question – it only published the first casualty list, on 22 August, and thereafter focused on triumphant rhetoric and promoting national unity. The other francophone newspapers, including Le Devoir released the casualty lists but did not comment on the losses.

Throughout the “heroic phase,” the newspapers differed only slightly in approach. Le Devoir explicitly emphasised “the names of French Canadians or Montrealers.” The editors clearly selected French Canadian surnames, regardless of where the person came from or whether they were officers or from the non-commissioned ranks. Only then were the surnames of Anglophones from Montreal mentioned, and only those of officers. Meanwhile, La Presse focused more on Montrealers, making no distinction in language. Unlike Le Devoir, the editor published photos of the casualties, including French Canadians of all ranks and in no particular order, but systematically presented the photographs of Anglophone officers. La Patrie followed the same approach, even though it had a lot less space to do so.

Whatever the approach, the result was the same - a disproportionate focus on francophone victims. That was not surprising since newspapers targeted francophone readers. Such over-representation helps explain the origin of the myth surrounding Dieppe; French Canadians were among those who had suffered the most. This was not necessarily the fault of the newspapers. The government’s own information services, by seeking to reach francophone audiences, may have contributed to this distorted view. Dependent upon official sources, and monitored as they were by the censorship, newspapers presented a stereotyped story, one that was not, in the end, very credible.

Ross Munro’s press conference in Montreal on 5 September, ten days
before the disastrous tally of casualties was revealed, likely strengthened the conviction that the French Canadian troops had suffered unduly heavy losses. The war correspondent traveled across Canada to discuss Dieppe and maintain the patriotic fervor. In effect, he adapted his story to the public in Montreal, making the Fusiliers the center point of his narrative. He declared:

The flotilla that transported the Fusilier Mont-Royal was positioned at the center [emphasis added] of the expedition...on its left, traveled the Royal Regiment of Toronto. A little ahead, there were the flotillas carrying the Essex Scottish of Windsor and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. On the right, other craft carried the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg. Compared to his first account, published in the aftermath of 19 August,53 Munro’s story was much toned down. Was it censorship? Bodies shredded by artillery had given way to heroes identified and made to seem invulnerable. In front of a crowd of 8,000 people, Munro rightly hailed the heroism of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal’s chaplain, Captain Armand Sabourin, and their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard.54 Munro presented an almost superhuman portrait of the FMR’s commander:

Colonel Ménard had taken the lead and was ready to launch an assault on the enemy when he got hit while climbing over the seawall. Enemy fire was very heavy and originated from houses where they had taken shelter, but also from the cliffs overlooking the beach and the city. Despite his injuries, Colonel Ménard remained at his post and, with the help of his officers, kept directing his men. Mixed with the regiments from Toronto and Hamilton, they fought with courage and nerve for hours.55

Munro insisted: “nothing could have stopped the French Canadians – go forward was the order given and go forward it remained.” All the ingredients of an adventure story were there: a brave, young French Canadian officer who galvanized the courage of his troops despite overwhelming odds. Tailor-made for the French Canadian public, the remarks were in fact not truthful. The correspondent presented himself as an eyewitness to the exploits of the French Canadian regiment while, in fact, he had landed in Puys with the Royal Regiment, some three kilometres of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.56 How could he claim to have witnessed the French Canadians in action? In essence, Munro became a propagandist working on behalf of the war effort and his story mirrored the Army’s press releases. Some historians have since denounced such an approach.57

Revealing the losses: French Canadian sacrifice

On 15 September 1942 the Canadian public learned what had long been feared - more than half the troops landed at Dieppe had been lost: a disaster. This did not stop La Presse from celebrating the operation: “Canada’s total losses at Dieppe reached 3,350 dead, wounded and missing. It, so far, one of our most glorious feats overseas” – even though the compiled casualty lists occupied two full pages.58 Le Devoir could not help but make an ironic comment: “Alas! There is no war without a cost.”59

Once the official tally was known, Canadian newspapers reacted differently and not necessarily according to their political affiliations. For example, John Collingwood Read from The Globe and Mail questioned the relevance of the operation and the competence of those in charge and argued that the benefits were not worth the cost. Other newspapers denounced the lack of transparency from military officials. The Liberal Regina Leader-Post lamented the excessive appeal to heroism at the expense of truth.60 The other Liberal dailies remained quiet on the issue or accepted the official version.61
In Quebec, the same dynamic took place. La Presse’s editorialist took notice of the tally but insisted that it did not diminish the achievement:

“...commandos” accomplished their mission under circumstances where before the attack every detail had been considered, but the men did not know that the gains would come at a heavy cost. It did not matter! They were given a task to complete and they would accomplish it without considering the risks and dangers. They approached their task proud, brave and with an admirable attitude in the tradition of our Dominion’s officers and soldiers during the Great War.

Then, using the official discourse he added: “Their sacrifice was not in vain: it will help us prepare for the day we can defeat the enemy and restore peace in the world.”

More surprising was the absence of immediate reaction from Le Devoir. The editorial of 15 September did not elaborate on the official numbers. Gérard Pelletier did not address the issue until the following week when Ralston presented his report. Even then, he reiterated the Globe and Mail’s “very sensible” question. How could it be that an operation that depended on the element of surprise was continued after German ships intercepted the Allied convoy? Ironically Le Devoir and the Toronto newspaper agreed on one thing: the responsibility of defence minister Ralston in an affair still wrapped in questions that was “very costly, with positive results that remained to be determined.” Only La Patrie was openly critical. Eustache Letellier de Saint-Just questioned the good faith of those who had sponsored the raid:

Now the truth is known, we do not believe public opinion in Canada will be satisfied with the official explanation that the raid on Dieppe was instrumental in obtaining crucial information on the defensive organization of the enemy. If the expedition’s only goal was to survey coastal defences, one wonders why the same result could not have been achieved with a smaller deployment of troops.

The concern expressed by this column, not to mention the discretion of the other Quebec newspapers, had a lot to do with the conscription crisis. For the underlying issue remained conscription. That could explain why in the beginning the Liberal press emphasized the role of French Canadians at Dieppe which so irritated many Conservative newspapers. Once the final cost was known, Liberal dailies appeared hesitant to openly criticize the operation, for fear of giving the debate over conscription a new impetus. Any wasteful usage of troops, as Dieppe proved to be, only fueled a conservative press eager to demand conscription. At that stage, it was less the failure of the raid that preoccupied Liberals than the way it was exploited for political reasons. To highlight the losses put greater pressure on the government to act. The editor of La Patrie thought it was cause for concern: “In the light of what we now know about the organisation of the Dieppe raid, it would be a profound mistake to invoke the losses the Canadian army sustained to stir up the agitation over conscription.” As for Le Soleil, its editorialist criticized the Tory press for pushing aside the real reasons behind the disaster and debating instead the benefits of future recruiting:

In short, he wrote, the failure of these two operations [Hong Kong and Dieppe] have been costly for Canada, but it is certainly not the fault of Colonel Ralston [minister of National Defence] or [Prime Minister] Mackenzie King...They know full well that the political agitators are careful not to directly attack the federal cabinet. They do not blame him for the poor preparations or the sacrifice of so much vital energy, but they insist on finding out from the government what measures it will take to replace
two regiments lost in fifteen days [at Hong Kong] or the thousands of men sent to their death in five hours [at Dieppe].

On 18 September 1942, Ralston got the last word when he released to the press the first official report on Jubilee. It proved increasingly difficult to hide the fact that the strategy behind the raid, except for a few minor successes - Varengeville and Pourville - failed. The details were damning, even for an uninformed reader: the tanks were rapidly immobilized under enemy fire and reserve units were landed, in particular the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, despite the obvious traffic jam on the beach. In spite of the use of hyperbole such as the “magnificent support offered by the Royal Navy,” the report failed to convince the press of the value of the raid.

The first reaction came from The Globe and Mail which wondered why the operation was not postponed when the element of surprised was lost? The newspaper attributed 67 percent of all losses to this mishap. In Le Devoir, Georges Pelletier was quick to chime in: “the ‘Globe and Mail’ of Toronto (19 September) is asking a question that makes great sense...No doubt Mr. Ralston might consider dispelling any confusion over a very costly affair, as positive results have yet to be determined.”

From then on, to give a favourable impetus to various Victory Bond campaigns, the focus was to be on the “exploitation” of Dieppe. The minister invoked the context of the war and remained vague on the “lessons of Dieppe”: “the value of the Dieppe expedition will be explained at a later time. For now, it is impossible to publicly analyze the lessons of the raid without offering information to the enemy.”

In early October, the awards ceremony conducted for the “heroes” of Dieppe ended the cycle of media coverage of Jubilee. As usual, Le Devoir emphasised French Canadians, pointing out that 27 of their soldiers had been “decorated for bravery” and “the FMR had the largest number [of decorated soldiers].” Two weeks later, a large rally held at Parc Lafontaine in honor of the “heroes” of Dieppe was aimed at promoting the sale of Victory Bonds. The announcement made all the dailies’ headlines, except for Le Devoir which published an account the following day on page three. The grand return of the heroes was carefully orchestrated. Louis Saint-Laurent, the minister of Justice, C.G. Power, minister of National Defence for Air, Adélard Godbout, the premier of Quebec, and Brigadier-General Panet presided over the event. The evening ceremony began with a procession and the singing of “O Canada” and ended with “God Save the King.” The government ordered that all radio
stations broadcast the tribute. The climate of distrust did not stop French Canadians from attending the event in great numbers and applauding their “heroes.” According to Le Canada, a cheering crowd of 25,000 people attended the ceremony. More sober, Le Devoir confirmed that the crowds prevented many among the public from getting close enough to their idols. Kept at a distance, many had to resign themselves to listening to the speeches through speakers. The rally offered a good opportunity to recapitulate the stereotyped account of the raid and launch the third Victory Bond campaign. The day of the ceremony, interviews with Dollard Ménard, Armand Sabourin and other veterans were published in La Presse. Ménard recalled the raid in strategic terms – “Dieppe was a necessary operation,” read the headline, whereas Father Sabourin praised the heroism of the Fusiliers – “Brave men! All of them were brave.” Ménard chose to stick to his soldiers’ performance: “Dieppe was a necessary raid where the Canadians were successful!” He hedged his comments, claiming that he only wished to share his impressions and what he had observed. However, the next day, his speech clearly took on a propagandistic tone:

Our arrangement complete, he declared, we had time to reflect on the night of 18 August. We thought of France, oppressed under German rule. We thought of women, desperate mothers, children deprived of food by the Nazis; we thought of the French who had become slaves; we thought that the price of capitulation is infinitely greater than the price of victory.

The lieutenant-colonel did not hesitate to reference the Great War and the battles that had inspired his men: Vimy, Courcelette, Passchendaele and Ypres: “We knew we could not be less brave than those who fought the other war.” He concluded his speech with an overt call to support the war effort by promoting the third Victory Bond campaign:

Those over there who risk their lives for you have the right to count on your support at all times. Through your hard work and your money, you are the ones who come up with the weapons that will give us victory. Without those weapons, the most admirable heroes will remain powerless. I have learned today that the government is launching a third war loan. Allow me to ask you to be generous. Those who do not lend their lives must donate.

We do not know the impressions left by Ménard’s words on the French Canadian public, but we do know that the words of Father Sabourin scandalized the nationalist elite. Unlike Ménard, Sabourin was political. In numerous radio and newspapers interviews the FMR chaplain, repeatedly and bitterly targeted the anti-conscriptionists. “The ones who stood up were those who stormed Dieppe” and not those who oppose the war effort overseas, claimed Sabourin. Even though such strong words did not appear in Le Devoir, or any other newspaper, the whole affair shook up the Church’s hierarchy. In his memoirs, Lionel Groulx recalls that, at the time, the archdiocese of Montreal was “bombarded” with letters and calls of protest. In a letter to Archbishop Charbonneau, Groulx himself complained about the incident:

Our people accept when the clergy reminds them of their duty in wartime; they do not understand when priests become outspoken and provocative propagandists on behalf of the government’s war policy, especially when they preach mindless attachment to colonial ties and openly advocate for overseas conscription. In truth, is this really the role of a servant of the Church? And, what do we gain at aggravating, in so many ways, the emotions of our youths?

According to Groulx, the archbishop promised to silence Sabourin, without much result as it turned out, as the higher clergy supported the Canadian government’s war policy. Commentary on the raid faded from the newspapers.

**Epilogue**

Has the tragedy been forgotten for all that? In postwar Quebec, small reminders of the raid could be found in the press. However, it was not until the 1960s that the event reappeared in the collective memory of the province. A curious transition from one generation to the next appears to have taken place with the more progressive elements adopting the same criticisms the Conservatives had used to frame the outcome of the raid in the immediate aftermath. This evolution is obvious in the newspaper articles published following the 20th anniversary of Dieppe. As much as it was accommodating in 1942, La Presse, consistently expressed the painfulness of the memory. For over thirty years, La Presse journalist Pierre Vennat remained the most faithful guardian of that memory. Son of Lieutenant André Vennat, who was killed at Dieppe, the journalist, commemorated the raid and remembered his father in the columns of the daily newspaper of the rue Saint-Jacques. Writing on important anniversaries, Vennat combined individual and collective memory. Though the narrative of his articles remained consistent from one commemoration to another, it is
possible to discern over the years the growing revolt of a son against his father’s sacrifice. This personal revolt came to symbolize that of an entire generation against the oppression the previous generation had endured.

A similar attitude towards the participation of French Canadians can be seen in a number of media, history textbooks and literature. In this regard, the statement in Le petit manuel d’histoire du Québec appears all the more significant:

[By saying no to the 1942 plebiscite on conscription] Quebeckers refused to wear the uniform and be sent overseas to be used as English cannon fodder. That feeling was confirmed on 19 August with the Dieppe disaster. The British Chiefs of Staff want to find out whether the Germans are properly defending the French coastline. To verify the obvious, they sent 6,100 soldiers, four-fifths of those Canadians, to the French coast in 253 ships. The poor fellows fell upon a German convoy some three miles away from the coast and the massacre began. When they managed to land near Dieppe, German machine guns mowed them down like rabbits. After two hours [sic] of this bloody butchery, the Chiefs of Staff understood that the Germans defended the coastline well. Orders were given to evacuate. Of 4,963 Canadians, 2,752 [sic] were killed by the Germans. The colonized are always used as cannon fodder by those who colonize them.81

Claiming a circulation of 125,000 copies at the end of the 1970s, this essay confirms the evolution of Quebec’s intellectual landscape of that period.

Conclusion

A newspaper analysis of the Dieppe raid offers an impressionistic, yet revealing image of French-Canadian public opinion. The examination confirms the theory of Henry and Tator that the content of the press can be reflective of the interaction of multiple schools of thought in a society.82 Despite censorship of the press, contrasting opinions which sometimes go beyond partisan lines are apparent. The majority of the Liberal francophone dailies very clearly supported the Canadian government’s war policy, though that did not prevent some editorialists from severely questioning the relevance of the raid. Le Devoir, against all odds, demonstrated a surprising sense of caution. Meanwhile, the Conservative Globe and Mail used the raid’s failure to criticize the Liberal government. On the other hand, Le Canada, regularly denounced those who criticized the raid. Overall, newspapers had little choice but to relay the information fed to them by the official press services. For obvious political reasons including the challenge of conscription, the information shared with French Canadians was grossly manipulated. The only francophone unit involved in Operation Jubilee was placed at the heart of the raid and those in charge of communications manufactured heroes in order to seduce susceptible readers. No doubt the intention was to stimulate volunteering for service and to erase accusations of cowardice born out of a nearly unanimous rejection of conscription in the province. The attempted manipulation of the story proved all the more clumsy when the almost daily releases of casualty lists were published alongside the triumphant discourse celebrating the “heroes of Dieppe.” Ironically, the relentless media coverage that focused on these heroes appears to have backfired. Once the full extent of the disaster was revealed in mid-September, French Canadians created a new story with the FMR as the main victims of the raid. The “Heroes of Dieppe” that were crafted by Combined Operations Headquarters played a central role in creating a potent symbol of colonial oppression which lingered for decades in French Canadian interpretations of the raid.

The study of the French Canadian collective memory of the Dieppe raid confirms a persistent resentment in Quebec. Contrary to English Canada, where emotions were channelled through detailed historical analysis, the raid did not inspire critical studies on the francophone side.83 Instead the memory of the event was transmitted primarily through literature and textbooks.84 French Canadians never seriously debated Operation Jubilee. Two reasons can be surmised: the absence of institutions able to support the growth of the francophone military historiography and the difficulty of identifying with British military tradition which was perceived as foreign. For francophone Quebeckers, the political aspects of the raid took precedence over military considerations. With the rise of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, the event resurfaced and became a symbol of colonial oppression. The essence of that discourse can be summed up in a single sentence: Canadians, particularly French Canadians, were sacrificed in the name of British interests in a war that did not concern them. The details of the raid have faded, but the resentment that fuelled the myth remains strong.

Notes

7. Ibid., pp.166-177.
8. Ibid., pp.2, 11.
11. Ibid., pp.166-177.
13. Ibid., p.1; *La Presse*, 20 août 1942, p.21.
16. Ibid., p.3.
18. Ibid., p.3.
28. Ibid., pp.182-183.
30. "Such an attitude has important implications," writes Claude Beauregard. Ross Munro “was one of the few correspondents to participate in the Dieppe Raid (19 August 1942). His first article on this operation gives the impression that the raid was a success. Yet he had to realize that it was a monumental disaster. But censorship was at work." Beauregard, pp.182-183. Similarly, Bob Bowman of Radio Canada, also at Dieppe, reported that the raid was a success: "Without this experience, a second front would have been suicide." LAC, fonds Bushnell, MG 30, E250, vol.1, dossier 17, Bob Bowman, "Canadians at Dieppe, an Eyewitness Account," 20 August 1942, cited by Beauregard, p.183.
34. Ibid., pp.170-170.
This resurgence is particularly evident at the unveiling of a monument to the FMR at Dieppe on 18 August 1962. Lieutenant-Colonel Ménard, former commander of the regiment is at the forefront. This is the first major official commemoration of the raid that brought together more than 400 veterans. The ceremony was also attended by the veterans affairs ministers of Canada and France. Le Devoir, 11 août 1962, p.2.


82. Henry and Tator.


84. On this topic, see: Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe, p.99-139.

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