“But he has nothing on at all!”
Canada and the Iraq War, 2003

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Abstract: In March 2003, Canada abstained from participating in the invasion of Iraq. Despite international pressure from Canada’s close allies, the United States and Great Britain, and against the urging of some domestic lobby groups and the Official Opposition, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose not to provide military or political support for the invasion. Chrétien’s decision was a controversial one, but one made early in the crisis and before the outbreak of war. Although Canadian public opinion and the professional advice of Canadian diplomats and intelligence officials counselled against participation in the war, these arguments served only to buttress Chrétien’s initial negative reaction and his desire to work within the United Nations.

In Hans Christian Andersen’s fable The Emperor’s New Clothes, an emperor is swindled into buying a new wardrobe. The wardrobe, of course, does not really exist and the emperor appears publicly in the nude. He and his courtiers, convinced only the worthy can see the garments, are unwilling to admit they see wholly through the new clothes. In Andersen’s version, one young child loudly exclaimed the emperor was naked. In 2003, a similar drama – though with far greater consequences – played on the world stage.

In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, France and other states called out shrilly that they could see through the American case for war. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, too, noticed early the United States’ case for war was built on a faulty premise, but he avoided the adversarial tones adopted by the French. Rather than publicly embarrass the Americans, Chrétien told President George W. Bush that Canada would support military action against Iraq if the United States could convince the international community an invasion was necessary. By basing his test of support on overwhelming international approval – and not ruling out Canadian participation – Chrétien ensured Canada was a relevant player in the United Nations debate. When international approval had not been gained by the eve of war, the prime minister stood fast with the position he had communicated to both Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the late summer of 2002, and kept Canada out of the war.

Shortly after 11 September 2001, Canadian ambassador to the United States Michael Kergin arrived in Ottawa to brief the government on the ramifications of the terrorist attacks. He described the Manichean worldview Washington had adopted in the wake of the attack, and warned Canada must be prepared to deal with a United States whose international outlook was coloured only in black and white. Although Afghanistan would undoubtedly be the first target of the American response, Kergin knew that American retaliation was not likely to be limited to one country. In the mean time, while Afghanistan was the only front in the response to the terrorist attacks, Canadian policy easily matched that expected by the Americans. Jean Chrétien honoured those killed in the attacks, publicly supported the United States at the United Nations and dispatched special operations forces, naval assets and later a battle group to Afghanistan.

As American and allied operations in Afghanistan began in earnest in the autumn of 2001, it became increasingly obvious that the United States was considering a second target. Soon after 11 September 2001, Canadian officials noticed American intelligence reports paying special attention to Iraq, isolating it from lists of other countries and noting Iraq’s failure to express sympathy with the Americans. Around the same time, Chrétien was alarmed by a television interview with United States Senator Jesse Helms calling for an invasion of Iraq. It was not long before the
American press started reporting on intelligence leaks that linked Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda, and by January 2002 Kergin was fielding questions from reporters curious if Canada would support an invasion of Iraq. By August 2002, there was no doubt in Ottawa that the United States would target Iraq. Expanding the “War on Terror” beyond Afghanistan was not something Canada would agree to without careful consideration. On 14 August, Clerk of the Privy Council Alex Himelfarb sent Chrétien a memorandum stating bluntly: “U.S. action against Iraq to implement regime change is a question of when, not if, using the justification that the Iraqi government is a sponsor of terrorism and a developer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” Himelfarb noted the international community was deeply split on the issue, but the Canadian position “has centred on the return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq to resolve the disarmament question and to address the issues of terrorism when clear evidence is available.” The memorandum’s faith in the United Nations inspectors and disapproval of regime change captured the two main elements in Chrétien’s conception of the crisis.

Only weeks after Himelfarb’s warning, Chrétien informed Blair and Bush of Canada’s position on war with Iraq. The prime minister’s comments to Bush and Blair would set the approach Canada would follow through the difficult months to come. While meeting with Blair in Johannesburg in early September, Chrétien expressed his discomfort with regime change in Iraq. He warned of the dangers of “getting in to the business of replacing leaders we don’t like” without being covered “under the flag of the UN.” No country, Chrétien told Blair, could invade Iraq without UN authorization. Clearly, Chrétien believed any military action would not simply be a continuation of United Nations pressure on Iraq to disarm, but part of a new American concept of national security that threatened to undermine the international structures Canada had worked to create.

On 9 September 2002, less than a week after meeting with Blair, Chrétien and Bush met in Detroit to announce a new border agreement between Canada and the United States. By all accounts, the relationship between Chrétien and Bush was a friendly one with good personal chemistry aided by a mutual interest in baseball and golf. It was strange for all observers, however, when the two men opted to meet in private before their announcement, without the usual retinue of staffers to hear or record their conversation. After the half-hour meeting, Chrétien de-briefed Kergin, telling him he had expressed concern over the impending invasion of Iraq. Chrétien had told Bush the international community would not accept an invasion of Iraq without credible evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Chrétien had also made clear the United Nations Security Council was extremely important to Canada, and Canada would require its approval to participate in a war. Chrétien left the meeting highly sceptical of the American evidence for war, but still on good terms with Bush.

Chrétien’s comments in Detroit came to serve as the speaking points for the Canadian government. Kergin returned to Washington equipped with the prime minister’s position; from now on his standard response to any inquiries on Canada’s participation in an invasion would stress the importance of the Security Council. Across the Atlantic, Canada’s high commissioner to the United Kingdom, Mel Cappe, informed the British that Canada sought agreement.
among the international community before military action, preferably through a Security Council Resolution at the United Nations.14 Deputy Prime Minister John Manley told the press that Canada had not “signed on” to “going in and changing the regime” in Iraq.15 Underlying this standard message, however, was the prime minister’s scepticism of American motives. Chrétien already assumed the goal of military intervention was regime change. Warnings from Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations, stressed a new American security strategy with emphasis on unilateral military intervention reinforced his concern.16

Just days after the Detroit meeting, Bush appeared before the United Nations General Assembly and argued for increased international pressure on Iraq to ensure Saddam Hussein complied with his obligations to disarm. A month later, in November 2002, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441, declaring Iraq “in material breach of its obligations [to disarm]” and affording Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”17 The resolution was achieved by intense negotiation, and contained contradictory elements. It did not directly authorize the use of force, and the “serious consequences” threatened were variously interpreted. For those who interpreted the resolution as authorizing force, a lack of time limits resulted in further confusion.18

In Britain, the ambiguity of 1441 and the looming war caused a rift in the governing Labour caucus and a major crisis for Tony Blair. To assuage his critics and his party, Blair promised to seek a second, less ambiguous, resolution from the Security Council.19

The confusion inherent in 1441, and Blair’s promise, led to further intense negotiations in New York. During the negotiations, Chrétien frequently called President Vicente Fox of Mexico and President Ricardo Lagos of Chile, both of whose nations were represented on the Security Council. Noticing the stress these men were facing, Chrétien remarked to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham that although Canada constantly sought a seat on the Security Council, holding a seat was a mixed blessing. At times like this, it would bring enormous pressure like that faced by Mexico and Chile. While free of the Security Council, Canada was able to operate at the United Nations with fewer constraints.20

Despite not having a seat on the Council, Graham was in constant contact with his European and American colleagues; Dominique de Villepin of France, Javier Solana of the European Union, but much less with British Foreign Minister Jack Straw. Graham’s closest contact was Secretary of State Colin Powell, with whom Graham enjoyed a relationship that allowed for frank discussion. In December 2002, Graham told Powell that Canadians were trying to help the Americans obtain a new resolution. Powell said the Americans “really would rather not have your help.” Concerned by this, Graham told Powell that if the United States did not gain another resolution, “we’re not going to be there, other people won’t be there either, it won’t be good for the UN and in the end it won’t be good for you.”21

A significant Canadian troop presence in Iraq was a moot point after a 9 January 2003 meeting in Washington between Defence Minister John McCallum and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the meeting, Rumsfeld made clear he was not seeking Canadian troops for Iraq, and preferred Canada focus on Afghanistan. Neither the Pentagon nor the Office of the Secretary of Defense intimated to the Canadian embassy they would require Canadian troops in Iraq, or that they were upset when Canada did not send troops. During a visit to Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, and in meetings with General Tommy Franks, Kergin never received a message Canada ought to be involved in the military component of the invasion.22 But to suggest, as Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang do, that Canada’s decision to commit almost two thousand troops to Afghanistan got Canada “off the hook in Iraq” misconstrues the American pressure on Canada in the lead up to war.23
Although there was strong desire from elements in the Canadian military and Department of National Defence for Canada to participate in the invasion, it was the White House, not the Pentagon, who sought the Canadian flag and the political cover it granted an invasion.24 The decision to take a command rotation in Afghanistan alleviated none of the pressure on Canada to publicly support the legitimacy of an invasion of Iraq.

Immediately following the Rumsfeld-McCallum meeting, McCallum announced Canada would participate if the United Nations granted approval for an invasion.25 If, on the other hand, UN authorization were not forthcoming, Canada would still have a choice to make. Chrétien quickly corrected McCallum, declaring: “on matters of peace and security, the international community must speak and act through the UN Security Council.”26

The mild rebuke generated reports of divisions in Chrétien’s cabinet. Although the Cabinet frequently discussed Iraq, it was never a specific agenda item but instead was treated under “General Business.”27 Minister of the Environment David Anderson recalls that knowledge of the Middle East was slight in Cabinet, and even knowledge of the geography surrounding Iraq was limited. For some, the limited understanding of the region was coloured by information from the Israeli government, passed on by constituents with whom a minister or MP had reason to keep on friendly terms.27 Overall, the Cabinet was largely sceptical of war, and conversation concerned Canadian-American relations, not Iraq itself.

To differ with the Americans on an international issue was not in itself surprising or necessarily problematic, but the American rhetoric linking Iraq with the vital interests of the United States made this an exceptionally difficult situation.28 Two members of Cabinet, Manley and Secretary of State for International Financial Institutions Maurizio Bevilacqua, were later reported to have argued in favour of the war, fearing a political and economic backlash from the United States if Canada did not support its ally.29

Although no straw poll or other count of opinion was taken in Cabinet, the prime minister did consult key cabinet ministers in private discussions. Ministers such as Graham and McCallum were asked to weigh in, as were Ambassadors Heinbecker and Kergin. The prime minister also kept the pulse of his parliamentary caucus, the views of which “were a significant factor in the final decision.”30 Many Liberal members were responding to concerns of their constituents who collected signatures for petitions against the war. The caucus was nearly unanimous in opposition to war without the support of the United Nations, save one lone voice.31
David Pratt, Liberal chairman of the Commons defence committee, argued that basing a Canadian decision on the will of the United Nations was an “abdication of national responsibility.”

Given the overwhelming support of caucus and Cabinet for Chrétien’s position, McCallum’s comments in early January did not reveal a rupture in government opinion. Instead, Chrétien’s correction of McCallum’s remarks demonstrates his carefully managed strategy of avoiding direct disagreement with the United States. The Canadians ensured, through careful choice of words in press conferences and in the House, that a door was left open for Canadian participation if the Security Council overwhelmingly approved a military action but a Russian or Chinese veto prohibited a resolution. It is by this reasoning that Chrétien could argue Resolution 1441 did not necessarily need to be augmented by another resolution to authorize an invasion, and that the Canadian position in 2003 was consistent with its 1999 participation in the NATO bombing of Serbia. The seeming discrepancy between the two situations was a point of criticism made by many, including American ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci. David Anderson, who sat in the Cabinet during both the 1999 and 2003 decisions, notes the “difference was primarily that the international community was simply much more coherent on the Kosovo issue.”

Towards the end of January, Blair called Chrétien to tell him a successive resolution was going to pass in the Security Council and Canada should lend it moral support. Paul Heinbecker, who was in frequent telephone contact with Chrétien from late January until mid-March, told him Blair was wrong and the British and Americans would not get a second resolution authorizing war. Heinbecker, from New York, told Chrétien “People here just don’t believe they’ve made the case.”

and was shown some of the evidence Powell would present to the Security Council the following week. In another frank discussion, Graham told Powell war would “be a terrible problem for the United States and for everybody.” Graham went on:

as far as I can see your problem is going to be, if you go in there and it’s not universally accepted, you’re going to be an invader, and you think you’re going in as a liberator, but after you’ve been there a little while the people are going to hate you, and you’re going to get hated by everybody. You think it’s going to be a big love-in but you risk being perceived as an occupier.  

Powell disagreed, saying “this will be all over quickly.” He told Graham a resolution was a good thing, but should be achieved before February. Graham, quick to see the implications of this remark, told Powell it sounded “like you’ve already made up your mind to go whether you get one or not. If you get it it’s a cover, if not, ‘to hell with it,’ is sort of what you’re saying.” Powell did not reply, but his body language indicated to Graham he had understood the situation perfectly. In the press conference that followed, Graham insisted four times that Canada would want any war with Iraq to be sanctioned by the UN.  

Graham’s repeated reference to the United Nations reflected Canadian public thinking on the issue. Two days after Graham’s meeting with Powell, an Ipsos-Reid poll found 36 percent of Canadians against war altogether, with 46 percent supporting war only with United Nations backing. A mere 10 percent of Canadians supported military action without the backing of the United Nations. The resistance of Canadians to any military action, UN-authorized or not, was strong nation-wide. In Quebec, 46 percent were against any military action. 35 percent of Ontarians, 34 percent of Atlantic Canadians, 28 percent of British Columbians and 27 percent of those in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan were against the war even if a Security Council resolution was obtained. Nonetheless, as evidenced by Graham’s comment in Washington, the government was willing, at least publicly, to entertain the idea of supporting an invasion with Security Council approval but without a resolution. For Cappe in London, it seemed that by remaining somewhat ambivalent and ambiguous, the Canadians forced the Americans to take them seriously as a potential partner. This ensured Canada would be listened to in New York and Washington while negotiations on a further UN resolution continued.  

On January 27, Hans Blix updated the Security Council on the inspection of Iraq’s weapons programs. Blix, as the executive chairman of the United Nations...
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was tasked with verifying Iraq’s disarmament. He reported to the Council “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance… of the disarmament which was demanded of it.” This rebuke had a double-edged effect, spurring the Iraqis to increase co-operation while the United States held up Blix’s comments as independent verification of their claims that Saddam would not disarm.41

The next week, on 5 February, Powell appeared before the Council and presented a number of photos and sound recordings of the threat posed by Saddam. Powell’s presentation, according to Heinbecker, “was a load of crap, the best case that could be pieced together, but evidently full of problems and inconsistent in several cases with what the UN had reported from the ground.”42 Photos of a fighter jet spraying poison gas were dated from the war against Iran. Satellite photos purporting to show chemical weapons sites, later disproved, were “pretty evidently bogus at the time,” while accounts of intercepted conversations were so unspecific “they could be taken to mean almost anything.” Heinbecker was astonished that this was the best the Americans had to offer, and felt few were persuaded. Due to the eminence of the presenter, the Council was packed with onlookers, some of whom took the opportunity afterwards to share their frustration. Heinbecker and the Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations had an opportunity to speak to Powell. The Egyptian ambassador warned the Americans that while the invasion might succeed easily the US could face decades of conflict

Canadian officials had their own reason to question the intelligence presented by Powell. They had access to the same information, and had already found it wanting. In autumn 2002, Bush had offered to send intelligence experts to Ottawa to brief the prime minister, and later offered to come and brief Chrétien personally. Chrétien and his advisors agreed that it would be particularly uncomfortable to dispute the president’s evidence in person, and decided information should be passed to Canada through regular intelligence-sharing channels. Eddie Goldenberg, always sceptical of intelligence, recalls that intelligence was not a factor in the Canadian decision on Iraq.43 Intriguingly, however, it seems that Canadian intelligence officials made one of the most successful analyses of the Iraqi weapons program among Canada’s traditional allies. During the lead up to the war, the International Assessments Staff (IAS) in the Privy Council Office (PCO) served as the intelligence assessment branch for both Foreign Affairs and PCO. Through its established links with other intelligence communities, the IAS received large quantities of information on supposed Iraqi weapons programs, including the intelligence behind Tony Blair’s claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that could be deployed in 45 minutes. The Canadians also received intelligence passed along from the Iraqi defector “Curveball,” the informant responsible for Colin Powell’s claims of mobile weapons production vehicles. Despite the amount of circumstantial or indirect intelligence reporting that suggested an active WMD program, the lack of any direct intelligence led the IAS to assess repeatedly that there was no evidence Iraq had an active WMD program, or had developed the necessary delivery capacity.44

The Canadians came close to not receiving some of the intelligence at all. Some in the upper echelons of the Bush administration considered dropping Canada from the shared pool of information, wanting to restrict circulation to states that had guaranteed support to the Americans. The Canadian embassy worked hard to ensure this did not happen, arguing that Canada deserved access to the common pool due to their contribution in Afghanistan and their promise to help rebuild Iraq if war came.45

Perhaps one of the most important pieces of intelligence collected by the Canadian government did not
concern the working of Saddam Hussein’s government, but the Bush administration. In the months before the war, the intelligence liaison officer at the Canadian embassy in Washington received regular briefings from the CIA, but was also made aware of frustrations in the American intelligence community. As a result, the Canadians were aware the CIA was under political pressure to produce information confirming Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and knew a debate over the accuracy of the American intelligence was raging secretly in Washington.  

Nonetheless, the Americans had presented their intelligence at the Security Council, and Powell was continuing efforts at the United Nations. In the week following Powell’s presentation to the Security Council, after a Cabinet meeting where the issue was discussed, Heinbecker and Assistant Deputy Minister James Wright discussed the situation in the hallway. Neither man liked having “to choose between our neighbour superpower and our foreign policy and the international community.” Heinbecker knew no compromise was possible between the hard positions of yes or no on war. But if the decision-making was elongated in time, with Iraq facing a set timeline and a simple pass or fail disarmament test, agreement might be reached at the Security Council. This was the next logical step in a series of resolutions that had increasingly turned up the heat on Iraq. The Canadian plan could assure the Americans “the diplomatic process wasn’t going to last forever, and the Europeans and the rest of the international community would have the assurance that it wasn’t going to be straight off to war.”  

Chrétien backed Heinbecker’s plan, hoping “if we could get an extra six to eight weeks, the U.S. military strategists would have to delay their plans long enough to give everyone more time to work out a diplomatic solution.” To publicly clarify Canada’s position on the war, Chrétien delivered a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 13 February. He declared: “if it must come to war, I argue that the world should respond through the United Nations.” Chrétien commended Bush for approaching the United Nations in the fall of 2002, and urged the United States not to give up on the world body. “The long-term interests of the United States,” suggested Chrétien, “will be better served by acting through the United Nations than by acting alone.” Chrétien followed up on his speech with calls to world leaders seeking their support for a compromise position at the UN – a compromise that could repair the valued multilateral institution torn asunder by its membership’s debate over the looming invasion. Two days after Chrétien’s speech, Canadians demonstrated loudly against the impending war. 100,000 protesters took to the streets in Montreal, with protests in the tens of thousands occurring simultaneously in Vancouver, Toronto and Edmonton and ranging from the hundreds to the thousands in other provincial capitals.  

On 19 February, Heinbecker brought the Canadian compromise position before the Security Council with a stirring speech. He reminded the Council of the many voices calling for peace around the world, but acknowledged important questions remained about Iraq’s weapons programs. He suggested the Security Council direct Hans Blix to establish a list of “key remaining disarmament tasks,” in order of urgency, and to present the list to Iraq with a deadline for compliance. While a failure to find common ground would have “profound consequences” for international peace and security and the future of the United Nations, he declared both the government and people of Canada believed a peaceful resolution remained possible.  

In the days following Heinbecker’s speech, Graham took the floor in the House of Commons to explain Canada was working at the UN “to avert war by clarifying the situation.” Graham explained the two Canadian objectives: first, by suggesting a resolution with a timeframe, the international community could communicate to Saddam Hussein that his failure to comply could not drag on further. The second objective was to demonstrate to the international community a UN solution was possible and desirable.  

Back at the United Nations, on 24 February, Heinbecker circulated a discussion paper suggesting: “A defined process for a specific period of time to address the Iraq situation.” The proposal, explained Graham, was intended to “close the gap between the radical French position and that of the Americans.” The Americans, initially silent on the Canadian proposal, expressed their disapproval when it became obvious it would divert votes from a new American-drafted resolution. The next day the United States, United Kingdom and Spain introduced a draft resolution stating “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441.” The draft was abandoned when it became clear it would not receive the necessary votes in the Security Council.  

From Ottawa, Prime Minister Chrétien maintained telephone contact with Lagos and Fox. Both were under pressure from the Americans to join the coalition, but both men told Chrétien that they would not participate if Canada would refuse as well. Decision time was looming for all nations involved. In the House of Commons on 25 February, Chrétien said he expected “a vote before the second week of
March."60 Chrétien told the House the best means of achieving peace was “working discreetly and effectively, as our ambassador to the United Nations is doing.”

Indeed, Heinbecker continued to work the backrooms and corridors of the United Nations, seeking a compromise. On 11 March, Heinbecker once again was recognized to speak in the Security Council. He underscored the importance of the deliberations, proclaiming: “Peace and war hang in the balance.”61 Heinbecker acknowledged the Iraqis had only co-operated as a result of outside pressure, but urged the Council to avoid creating “doubt as to whether war were indeed the last resort.” In addition to the threats to international security he had noted in February, he told the Council it risked undermining international law and the Security Council as an institution. Heinbecker reiterated his call for a clear list of disarmament objectives to be completed by Iraq before the Council took “all necessary means to force compliance.”62 Rather than six weeks, Heinbecker shortened the suggested deadline for Iraqi compliance to three weeks. By compromising on a resolution, Heinbecker told the Council, “disarmament of Iraq can be had without a shot being fired.”

The Canadian delegation opted not to put direct pressure on the Americans to accept the compromise, but instead attempted to persuade the Security Council as a whole. Heinbecker was sure the Americans would ignore a direct Canadian appeal that advised a compromise.63 The only chance was through the gathered strength of countries that agreed with Canada. Canada had recently served on the Security Council, and was familiar with its politics. They were able to generate some momentum for a compromise, helped particularly by the British delegation, frantic to reach a rapprochement between the French and American positions.64 Besides certain British officials, there were even “some Americans who hoped for compromise that might avoid a potentially fateful adventure that lacked international sanction.”65

The Canadian position might have succeeded by two means. If the French had accepted the compromise, the British would have had to accept and the Americans would have had to commit to the compromise or face war without the support of its closest ally. If Washington had agreed to the compromise, the French position would have lost all basis for complaint.66 Heinbecker recalls, “it was actually a very good idea. The only thing wrong with it, of course, was that the Americans had made up their mind and wanted a war. War was not the final recourse for them.”67

The Americans had also decided to adopt a rather undiplomatic approach towards those who disagreed with them at the United Nations. The US “hardball” approach resulted in the removal of the Mexican, Chilean and Costa Rican ambassadors and an attempt to have the German ambassador removed. The Americans also undertook a campaign against Heinbecker. Having been informed by Heinbecker that the Americans were complaining loudly about his actions, Chrétien asked Heinbecker. “You’re a big guy aren’t you?” Chrétien asked Heinbecker. “You know what big guys do, they just ignore that stuff.”68

Despite Chrétien’s backing, Heinbecker had little expectation of success. But the circumstances were so grave, and “the consequences of failure were such, that if you made a 100% effort on the 5% chance, you might find some traction.”69 The Canadians were disappointed, but not surprised, when White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed the Canadian compromise, and a similar Chilean one, as being a “non-starter.”70 The Americans were careful not to appear too ham-handed, however, and did not go far in opposing the Canadian idea publicly. It appeared to Kergin in Washington that the United States had taken a calculated look at the positions in the Security Council and had realized the French were too far committed to an anti-war position to agree to a resolution that allowed the possible use of force.71 The Americans anticipated correctly, and a lack of French support eliminated hope for the compromise.72 It is striking, however, that one of the results of the Canadian compromise position could have resulted in United Nations approval for war. This would have placed Chrétien in a much worse position, with a commitment to the United Nations process in direct opposition to Canadian public opinion and his own instincts.

Four days after Heinbecker’s impassioned speech at the United Nations, the Canadian public once again took to the streets. On 15 March 2003, large protests swept provincial capitals, Ottawa, and smaller cities. This time, over 200,000 protesters took to the street in Montreal, boosted by calls from the Quebec Federation of Labour urging its half-million strong membership to participate. In Vancouver, there were 10,000 protesters, 5,000 in Toronto, 2,000 in London, 1,500 in Ottawa, and hundreds in Edmonton, Winnipeg and Halifax.73

Despite this outpouring of anti-war sentiment, the Canadian government never attributed any of its decisions to public opinion. According to David Anderson, demonstrations are only taken into account if they “confirm an existing position or are a real surprise.” When they do confirm a position, they are a political boon to a government.74 In the case of Iraq, the protests and public polling results demonstrated
to Chrétien and his Cabinet that Canadians were opposed to the war, and particularly so if military action was not sanctioned by the Security Council. But this only confirmed the position Chrétien had given Bush in September 2002. Indeed, the timing supports Eddie Goldenberg’s argument the decision was based on principle – not public opinion.75

Although there were protests across the country in March, the largest demonstrations were in Quebec. The strong anti-war sentiment in Montreal has led the noted historian Jack Granatstein to greatly overestimate the role of Quebec public opinion in Chrétien’s decision not to participate in the invasion. For Granatstein, who views the decision as part of a larger historical trend of Quebec determining Canadian foreign and defence policy, the “key” to the Iraq decision “was Quebec’s vehement anti-war opinion.” For his part, Eddie Goldenberg remembers no reference to Quebec in his discussions on Iraq with the prime minister or with Cabinet, though it was well known where Quebeckers stood.76 And Quebeckers stood, largely, in support of the conclusions that Chrétien had begun to draw in 2002. With Quebec public opinion aligned with the prime minister’s opinions, there was little need to discuss Quebec in Cabinet. As Quebec public opinion continued to support the government, there never came a time to consider the impact of a decision that might place Ottawa at odds with the province.77

Certainly not all Canadians were against participation in a war with Iraq, and some loudly called for war. Business lobbyists, notably the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association of Canada were concerned that failure to comply with the United States would adversely affect their bottom line. Kergin doubted the likelihood of such punishment, believing Canadian-American trade relations were the product of economic, rather than political, interests.78 Graham thought the business lobby was overreacting to possible US retaliation and failed to recognize war requires assent from the population. He refused to equate the decision for war with business transactions.79 Anderson found the business community’s behaviour just as abhorrent. He rejected the notion that commercial relations should impact a decision to go to war, refusing to measure loss of sales with loss of life. Furthermore, Anderson knew Canada had “a few cards up our sleeve” if the United States chose to punish Canada economically. Challenges to oil sands development
projects, or decisions concerning pipelines and other energy facilities could get the Americans’ attention. Overall, however, neither Kergin in Washington nor Anderson, Graham or Goldenberg in Ottawa saw serious evidence the Americans would retaliate.

The economic data confirms that there were no significant changes to Canada’s economic position vis-à-vis the U.S. In 2003, Canada’s merchandise trade balance with the United States was at the lowest point of a decline begun in 2001. Following Canada’s refusal to join the invasion, the Canadian trade balance actually improved. American foreign direct investment in Canada, which had steadily increased since the 1990s, continued to grow after the Iraq invasion. After the war analysts including Rick Fawn speculated that by not joining the war Canada had foregone economic opportunities including a more conciliatory US position on softwood lumber. There is no evidence of such a quid pro quo being offered by the United States. Upon further analysis, Fawn later conceded that the trade statistics demonstrated “no serious politically motivated economic retaliation occurred.”

After months of diplomacy, the Americans and British clumsily abandoned the United Nations, forcing Canada to refuse to participate in the coming invasion. On 15 and 16 March, while the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Britain and the United States met in the Azores, the British made a last unsuccessful effort to convince the Security Council to adopt a new resolution authorizing force. Hans Blix would later recall of March 16 that his inspection was operating at full strength, and “Iraq seemed determined to give [UNMOVIC] prompt access everywhere.” That day, he took a call from a United States diplomat urging the expeditious withdrawal of Blix’s inspectors from Iraq. War was imminent.

The next day, on 17 March, a morning telephone call from the British government put a pointed request to Ottawa. The British call posed four questions to the government, asking whether Canada would provide political or military support for the invasion and if Canada would make its assistance public. Immediately, Heinbecker was telephoned in New York, and he reported no UN resolution authorizing the use of force would succeed. Chrétien, his foreign policy advisor Claude Laverdure, Goldenberg and Heinbecker were all opposed to supporting an invasion. In Chretien’s office, Goldenberg insisted the prime minister make his response in the House of Commons before informing Cellucci or any other foreign government. The
British and American delegations in Ottawa were informed at noon the prime minister would provide an answer to the British questions in the House around 1415 hours. By the time Chrétien spoke, the Cable News Network (CNN) had been informed by the Americans that breaking news was about to be made and carried Question Period live.  

Chérétien’s stood in the House and announced: “If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate.” His remarks were met with loud cheers and an ovation from his ministers and backbenchers – all live on American television.

Over the next two days, Chrétien explained his position to the House, noting the issues that had concerned him in September 2002. Chrétien reminded Parliament he had “spoken very clearly that the position of changing of regimes in different countries is not a policy that is desirable any time.” He turned the focus back to weapons of mass destruction, arguing “Saddam Hussein was disarming…I am still of the view, given some more weeks, disarmament could have been achieved.” Overall, said Chrétien, “it is better not to have war as the first instance but as the last instance...[The Americans and British] had not made a case for the necessity of waging war on Iraq at this time.”

Still, the decision was not without significant risk. Days after Chrétien’s announcement, with the invasion underway, President of the Treasury Board Lucienne Robillard raised an ominous question in Cabinet: “What if [the Americans] find WMD?” No one could answer her question, and a tense wait followed Chrétien’s decision to abstain from the
coalition. While the ground assault against Iraq unfolded rapidly with early success, the Canadian as well as French and German governments were uneasy. They continued to privately pressure the British on their claims of the reputed weapons of mass destruction. It would be months before the Canadians had the grim satisfaction of knowing they had made a wise choice.

The raucous approvalChrétien received in the House pained Cellucci, who suffered “truly bitter disappointment” Canada did not join in the invasion. Cellucci had not taken care to cultivate close relationships with a broad cross-section of officials in Ottawa, and isolated himself from senior Canadian political advisors. He seems to have been convinced by some Canadian public servants that Canada would join the American invasion and either informed his masters of Canada’s likelihood of joining, or failed to suggest the possibility of Canada not joining. Either way, he looked foolish when Canada did not join the coalition, and he took his anger out on Graham during a “very cool” dinner at the Lester B. Pearson Building.

Although Stein and Lang claim the “Americans were more than a little surprised” by the Canadian decision, it had been clear to many in Washington that Canada would not participate barring Security Council approval. Kergin received stiff comments from administration officials and outright contemptuous remarks from Congressmen, but the American government was not taken by surprise. Chief of Staff Andrew Card told Chrétien “you told us from the beginning what you intended to do...We should have believed you.”

The decision not to inform the Americans but instead to announce in the House of Commons – with the government caucus standing to loudly cheer the decision – created an undiplomatic spectacle in the House of Commons later regretted by some. Kergin, who believed the courtesy of a communiqué should have been extended to the United States, says the decision resulted in some unnecessary bad will. The difficulties derived more from a lack of acceptable practice, rather than from the substance of the decision.

Later comments from Chrétien and his staff further distanced Bush from Chrétien. Bush cancelled a state visit planned for May 2003, and at the end of that month, Rice called Laverdure to tell him the two leaders’ relationship was “irreparably broken.”

Some in the Canadian business community were incensed by the decision not to support the Americans. Businessmen stopped Graham in airports, and none-too-politely made clear their views on his decision. Provincial premiers Ralph Klein, Ernie Eves and Gordon Campbell were quick to criticize the Canadian policy, obviously concerned the decision would affect provincial economies. Neither was the federal cabinet opinion fully unanimous. Secretary of State for International Financial Institutions Maurizio Bevilacqua was furious with the government’s position, arguing that it was crazy to disagree with the United States. In the overwrought hyperbole of the House of Commons, Leader of the Opposition Stephen Harper compared the Canadian decision not to participate with the failure to confront Nazi Germany in the 1930’s.

Despite the overblown rhetoric of the government’s critics, Canadian-American trade and diplomatic relations remained strong. Following the invasion, Kergin directed Canadian consulates to undertake a major study to determine if anything had changed in US-Canadian business relations. Although some individual consumers made choices designed to spite Canada, including refusal to buy Canadian maple syrup, there was no large-scale punishment meted out and no major contracts lost. It was determined that there was no economic consequence to Canada’s decision. At a speech by Graham to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations in November 2003, during the question and answer period, the audience suggested two reasons Canada was insulated from an economic backlash: first, Canada had made its decision without what was perceived as the self-righteous attitude of the French. Second, the American business community had significant investments in Canada and the notion that Americans could punish Canadian businesses without harming themselves was a chimera. It was clear to Graham that economic integration worked in Canada’s favour.

Graham and Powell continued to work closely on issues of joint importance, including Haiti and Afghanistan, and this cooperation softened any backlash at the diplomatic level. In Washington, the Canadian Embassy was not sidelined from updates on the war after the invasion. Instead, senior Canadian diplomats were invited to attend briefings given by Rumsfeld to the “coalition of the willing” partners. Canadians received updates on Operation Iraqi Freedom until the war became increasingly complicated and Rumsfeld reduced the frequency of the meetings. None of the Canadian troops serving on exchange with the American, British and Australian forces were killed, and the uproar created by the Opposition in the prelude to war largely disappeared from memory.

The prime minister’s appreciation of the situation, made so early, resulted from what his colleagues describe as an uncanny intuition. It stemmed from his ability to see through the flattering and cajoling of the United

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States, to understand the Americans had not proven their case, but largely, Anderson suspects, because “it offended every nerve in his body.”10

Both Graham and Anderson identify the unquantifiable “shrewdness” of Chrétien as the major factor behind his decision.10 Chrétien anticipated Canadian political opinion on the topic, but made his decision long before demonstrators had taken to the streets. He knew instinctively that the American evidence was insufficient to “convince any judge in a rural courthouse” before Canadian intelligence analysts came to the same conclusion.10 Most of all, Chrétien knew that the invasion of Iraq was not commensurate with the essence of the United Nations he considered a part of the Canadian identity. All the while, Chrétien and his diplomats worked to provide a dignified opportunity for the Americans to re-robe. They refused, of course, and suffered more than the embarrassment of exposure.

Notes

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1. Michael Kergin, interview by author, 10 April 2008, Toronto, ON.
3. The policy process that led to the American decision to invade Iraq is a controversial and complex one; space does not permit its rehashing here. An examination of the decision should begin with Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). For further reading, see the expansive “Iraq Wars Bibliography” assembled by Edwin Moïse at Clemson University: <www.clemson.edu/caah/history/ facultypages/EdMoise/iraqbib.html> (accessed August 31, 2010).
6. Kergin interview.
7. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister, p.307.
8. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister, pp.307-8.
12. Kergin interview.
17. Resolution 1441 (2002), United Nations Security Council, 8 November 2002, Available online at <www.un.org/documents/>. The debate over the Resolution was not limited to arguments between states; in both the United States and the United Kingdom, cabinet officials disagreed amongst themselves whether 1441 was sufficient to authorize force. In the United States, the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and of the Vice President argued no new Security Council resolution was required, while Secretary of State Colin Powell pressed for a second resolution. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
18. According to David Malone, “it may have been the UK need for a second Resolution that precipitated the clash within the Security Council.” Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, p.196.
20. Graham interview.
23. Graham interview.
24. In October 2002, a Canadian defence analyst had observed how ill prepared the Canadian Forces were for the “fast-moving conventional conflict” that was expected in Iraq. David Rudd, “Is the Cupboard Bare? The Canadian Forces in Iraq,” CISS Commentary, 2002, <www.ciss.ca/Comment_CupboardBare.htm> (accessed 31 August 2010).
27. Edward Goldenberg, interview by author, 7 May 2007, Toronto, ON.
30. Goldenberg interview.
33. Cellucci, Unquiet Diplomacy, p.146.
34. Anderson interview.
36. Graham interview.
38. Graham interview.
40. Cappe interview.
42. Heinebecker interview.
43. Goldenberg.
45. Kergin interview.
46. Nyffy interview.
47. Heinebecker interview.
48. Heinebecker interview.
49. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister, pp.303-4.
50. Jean Chrétien, “Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,”
55. “Text of Canadian discussion paper on Iraq that Canada’s UN ambassador circulated this week,” Canadian Press NewsWire, 27 February 2003, in CBCA.
59. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister, 313-4.
63. Heinbecker interview.
64. Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, p.199.
65. Heinbecker interview.
67. Heinbecker interview.
68. Heinbecker interview.
69. Heinbecker interview.
70. Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, p.153.
71. Kergin interview.
73. Arpon Basu “Some 200,000 people in Montreal join countrywide protests against war in Iraq,” 15 March 2003, and “1,250 turn out in Edmonton, Winnipeg, Vancouver for vigils to oppose Iraqi war,” 17 March 2003, both in Canadian Press NewsWire in CBCA.
74. Anderson interview.
75. Goldenberg interview.
77. Goldenberg interview.
78. Kergin interview.
79. Graham interview.
80. Anderson interview.
86. Goldenberg interview.
87. The questions are recounted in Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.1.
89. Goldenberg interview.
92. Goldenberg interview.
94. Cellucci, Unquiet Diplomacy, 141.
95. Goldenberg interview.
96. Graham interview.
97. Kergin interview.
98. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister, p.315. Some reports suggest that Ottawa notified the Americans of the Canadian decision in the morning before the prime minister’s House of Commons speech, but these seem to be confused. John Noble claims he has confirmed Chrétien asked his “diplomatic advisor” to call Rice before the announcement, but he does not provide his source. He does, however cite Bob Woodward, who has Rice say on March 18 that she had spoken with her Canadian counterpart. The CNN coverage, however, was on March 17. See John J. Noble, “PMO/PCO/DFAIT: Serving the Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Agenda,” in Canada among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), p.51. Also Woodward, Plan of Attack.
99. Kergin interview.
102. Ibid., and Graham interview.
104. Kergin interview.
105. Graham interview.
106. Peter Boehm, correspondence with author, 14 April 2003.
107. Anderson interview. Consider, for example, Chrétien’s previous position against war in Iraq in 1991.
108. Graham and Anderson interviews.

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